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Raul A Barreto and James Alm
How does the presence of corruption affect the optimal mix between consumption
and income taxation? In this paper we examine this issue using a simple
neoclassical growth model, with a self-seeking and corrupt public sector. We find
that the optimal tax mix in a corrupt economy is one that relies more heavily upon
consumption taxes than on income taxes, relative to an economy without corruption.
Our model also allows us to investigate the effect of corruption on the optimal size of
government, and our results indicate that the optimal size of government balances
the wishes of the corrupt public sector for a larger government, and so greater
opportunities for corruption, with those in the private sector who prefer a smaller
government. Not surprisingly, the optimal size of government is smaller in an
economy with corruption than in one without corruption.
Classification: H21, O17, O40
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Governments have a natural monopoly over the provision of many publicly provided 
goods and services, such as property rights, law and order, and contract enforcement, and a 
selfless and impartial government official would provide these services efficiently, at their 
marginal cost.  However, it has long been recognized that public officials are often self-
seeking, and such officials may abuse their public position for personal gain.  These actions 
include such behavior as demanding bribes to issue a license, awarding contracts in exchange 
for money, extending subsidies to industrialists who make contributions, stealing from the 
public treasury, and selling government-owned commodities at black-market prices.  In their 
entirety, these actions can be characterized as abusing public office for private gain, or 
“corruption” (Shleifer and Vishney, 1993). 
The idea of self-seeking government agents, particularly those who provide public 
services through public bureaus, is hardly new.
1  The typical bureaucrat is assumed to face a 
set of possible actions, to have personal preferences among the outcomes of the possible 
actions, and to choose the action within the possible set that he or she most prefers.  
Corruption can often result, and can become ingrained and systemic in a society’s institutions. 
  However, despite the widespread recognition of corruption, it is only recently that 
systematic analyses of its causes, effects, and remedies have been undertaken.
2  For example, 
there is now evidence that corruption distorts incentives, misallocates resources, lowers 
investment and economic growth, reduces tax revenues, and redistributes income and wealth, 
among other things.
3  The prevention of corruption is a more difficult issue.  Suggested 
remedies include the obvious ones of rewards for honesty and penalties for dishonesty.  
                                                                 
1  In this regard, Niskanen (1971, 1994), develops a theory of supply by bureaus. 
2  See, for example, Alam (1990), Geddes and Neto (1992), Kurer (1993), and Lapalombara (1994). 
3  There is a significant body of work in institutional economics linking the functions of government, particularly 
property rights, to economic development; see especially North (1990, 1993).  Also, see Mauro (1993) for 
empirical evidence on the effects of corruption on economic growth.  Note that Leff (1964) suggests that   3 
Increasing the transparency in government decision-making, improving the accountability of 
public officials, and, more generally, reducing the scope of government via privatization, 
deregulation, and other market reforms have been shown to help reduce or minimize 
corruption (Klitgaard, 1988; Klitgaard, MacLean-Abaroa, and Parris, 2000). 
However, despite these many useful insights, the effects of corruption on the tax 
structure of a country remain largely unexamined.  There is a large literature on the tax 
structure that maximizes social welfare in a static setting (e.g., Diamond and Mirrlees, 1970; 
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976), and there has also been much recent work on the appropriate mix 
of consumption versus income taxes to generate maximum growth (e.g., Jones, Manuelli, and 
Rossi, 1993; Stokey and Rebelo, 1995).  However, as recently emphasized by Tanzi and 
Davoodi (2000), the effects of corruption on the structure of a country’s tax system have not 
been studied. 
This is our purpose here: to determine the effects of corruption on the optimal mix 
between consumption and income taxes, using a simple neoclassical growth model with a self-
seeking and corrupt public sector.
4  In our model, the government is assumed to provide two 
kinds of public goods, one that enters the utility function of individuals and one that is used as 
an input in private production.  There are two agents, one public and one private, and each 
maximizes a utility function that depends upon consumption of the public good and also of a 
private good, where the public good is subject to congestion.  The government finances its 
activities by a consumption tax and an income tax.  Importantly, the public agent is assumed 
to have the ability to exploit monopoly rents in the provision of a public good to private 
industry; that is, there is corruption institutionalized within the public sector. The government 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
corruption might actually enhance efficiency by cutting through bureaucratic red-tape, a notion later 
demonstrated theoretically by Barreto (2000). 
4 In most of the endogenous growth literature that explicitly accounts for a government, the public sector is 
modeled with public goods that are trivially produced from tax revenues; see, for example, Barro (1990).  Barreto 
(2000) shows that the consideration of a more realistic public production function does not alter these analyses, 
as long as the government charges the competitive price.   4 
is assumed to choose its instruments to maximize a social welfare function that is the sum of 
public and private agent utilities.
5 
Our results indicate that the presence of corruption significantly alters the mix of 
consumption and income taxes.  Compared to an economy without corruption, the socially 
optimal tax structure with a corrupt government involves a greater reliance upon consumption 
taxes and a smaller use of income taxes.  However, this mix depends upon the social welfare 
weights of the public and private agents: the public agent prefers more use of income taxes 
than consumption taxes because the public agent’s income from corruption cannot be taxed 
under an income tax, while the private agent has the opposite preference.  In addition, our 
results are to examine the effect of corruption on the optimal size of government.  Our results 
show that this optimal government size balances the wishes of the corrupt public sector for a 
larger government, and so greater opportunities for corruption, with the desire of the private 
sector for a smaller government. Not surprisingly, the optimal size of government is smaller in 
an economy with corruption than in one without corruption. 
  The next section presents our model and discusses its solution.  Section III examines 
our results, and our conclusions are in Section IV.  An Appendix contains a complete 
description and solution of our analytic model. 
 
II.  A Theoretical Model of Endogenous Growth with a Corrupt Government 
Consider a simple endogenous growth model with a public good sector and two 
representative agents, one representing the public sector and one for the private sector.  The 
government is assumed to provide a public good for private consumption and one also for 
private production.  In the latter case, the public agent is assumed to have the ability to exploit 
                                                                 
5  There exist several endogenous growth models that examine the role of the public sector.  See Barro (1990), 
King and Rebelo (1990), Rebelo (1991), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), 
Devereux and Mansoorian (1992), Saint-Paul (1992), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993), Stokey and Rebelo   5 
the potential for monopoly rents in the provision of the public good.  The government finances 
its production with separate taxes on consumption and on income.  The public and private 
agents optimize intertemporally, and the government maximizes social welfare, defined as the 
unweighted sum of individual utilities.   
Government can be viewed as providing two kinds of public goods.  Public goods are 
nonrival and nonexclusive, and, as such, they can serve two basic and distinct functions.  One 
is to give utility to consumers by providing them with certain goods that they value but that 
are unlikely to be provided in efficient amounts by private markets.  The classic example of 
this type of public good is national defense; other examples include public parks, swimming 
pools, and similar kinds of public facilities.  We denote this type of public good a public 
consumption good, or zt, where the subscript t represents the time period. 
A second function of public goods is to facilitate private production.  Contract 
enforcement falls into this category, as does much public infrastructure like roads and bridges.  
This type of public good may therefore be thought of as an intermediate good in the 
production process.  We call this type of public good a public production good, or gt.  
Production of this good depends upon the amount of public capital k1t.  The public production 
good gt is assumed to be an input in the production of the private output, which is denoted yt.  
Private production also requires the use of private capital, or k2t. 
There are two agents.  Agent 1 is assumed to be the public agent, and Agent 2 is the 
private agent.  Corruption is introduced by allowing Agent 1 to control the production and 
distribution of the public production good gt; that is, the public agent is assumed to derive 
revenue, or corruption income yt, by the ability to extract monopoly rents from the sale of the 
public production good gt to private industry.  Agent 2 controls production of the private good 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
(1995), and Turnovsky (1996). Endogenous growth models that address rent-seeking behavior include Pecorino 
(1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1994).   6 
yt, which is produced with private capital k2t and the public production good gt.  Capital is 
completely mobile between the public and private sectors. 
The two representative agents receive income from separate sources.  The private 
agent has income only from the production of the private good yt.  In contrast, the public agent 
receives all income yt from the ability to exercise market power over the distribution of the 
public production good gt to private industry.  The intuition follows Shleifer and Vishney 
(1993), and is straightforward.  Private industry requires some degree of services, or 
cooperation, from the public sector in order to produce anything (e.g., licenses, contract 
enforcement, public infrastructure).  However, these services are ultimately in the hands of 
individuals within government, and these officials need not provide their services free of 
charge.  In fact, since private industry really may have no choice but to accept whatever 
degree of public cooperation that is offered at whatever price is asked, a public official may 
act as a monopolist over the administration of this particular arm of the government.  The 
implication for our model is that the public agent receives the monopoly rent, or corruption 
income yt, from the provision of the public production good. 
Although their income sources differ, the agents are faced with similar intertemporal 
utility functions, in which utility depends upon consumption of the private consumption good 
cit and the public consumption good zt, over an infinite planning horizon, where i denotes 














￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ,  i=1,2,   (1) 
where r is the pure rate of time preference, s measures the impact of public consumption on 
the welfare of the individual agent, and g is related to the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution.
6 
                                                                 
6 The functional form of the utility function follows Turnovsky (1996), who shows that the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution equals 1/(1-g).   7 
The government derives revenue from an income tax and a consumption tax.   The 
income of the private agent is taxed at ratet .  However, because income from corruption is by 
definition illegal income, the income of the public agent is assumed to be untaxed.  In 
contrast, consumption expenditures of both agents are taxed at rate w .  Total government tax 
revenue is denoted by ct , where 
( ) ( ) 12 ttttt ccy cwty =￿++￿-.          (2) 
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where d is the congestion coefficient and yt is aggregate private output.  In order for the level 












 .              (4) 
By representing public goods in this manner, less than perfect degrees of non-excludability 
and non-rivalness may be considered.  Analytically, congestion affects the growth rate and 
therefore the model’s solution through the term for the marginal utility of capital that appears 
in the Euler equations.
7 
  The public agent maximizes utility, subject to the following constraints: 
( ) 12121 ttttgtttt rrkPgrk y =-￿=￿-￿          (5) 
  ( ) 11 1 ttt cs yw =￿++              (6) 
1 tt gvk =￿                 (7) 
12 ttt kkk =+                (8)   8 
  12 tttt kssk x =+-￿ &  ,              (9) 
where 
yt = total output at time t 
gt = public production good at time t 
Pgt = price of the public good at time t  
v = inverse productivity factor = coefficient of “red tape”, 0£v£1 
cit = agent i’s consumption at time t, i = 1,2 
sit = agent i’s saving at time t, i = 1,2 
yt = corruption at time t 
r1t = the marginal product of capital in the public sector at time t 
r2t = the after-tax marginal product of capital in the private sector at time t 
k1t = capital used in the public sector production function at time t 
k2t = capital used in the private sector at time t 
r  = the pure rate of time preference 
x = the economy-wide depreciation rate of capital 
w = the consumption tax rate, 
 
and where a dot over a variable denotes a time derivative.  Equation (5) defines the income of 
Agent 1, equation (6) is the public agent’s budget constraint, equation (7) denotes a linear 
technology for the public production good, equation (8) shows the total supply of capital, and 
equation (9) is the equation of change for total capital.  The private agent, Agent 2, faces a 













          (10) 
  22 tgtttt yPgrk =￿+￿              (11) 
t g 1t vk =￿                 (12) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 22 11 ttt t ycs ytw -￿-=￿++          (13) 
  12 ttt kkk =+                (14) 
  12 tttt kssk x =+-￿ & ,              (15) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
7 By explicitly considering congestion within the utility function, the marginal utility of capital becomes non-
zero; an additional implication is that another element enters each agent’s Euler equation.  The presence of 
congestion in endogenous growth models is discussed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).     9 
where f( ) is the general production function for total output, A and "  are coefficients in the 
production function, andt is the income tax rate.  A bar over a variable signifies that the 
variable is fixed and given for the agent.  Equation (10) specifies the production technology 
for total output, equation (11) defines the uses of output, and equation (13) is the budget 
constraint for Agent 2.  Other equations are identical to those of Agent 1. 
  The two agents engage in a simple sequential game.
8  At any given time, say t=0, there 
exists some total supply of capital kt=0.  Agent 1, the public agent, is assumed to go first by 
choosing the amount of k1t=0 that is needed to produce the desired amount of the public 
production good gt=0.  However, Agent 1 is a monopolist in the provision of the public 
production good to Agent 2, and limits the amount of gt=0 available to the economy in order to 






= , which 
is endogenously determined via a modified golden rule.  Corruption income yt=0  is paid in 
final goods.  The corrupt agent may devote income toward consumption c1t=0 or saving s1t=0, 
as given in equation (6), where Agent 1’s consumption is taxed but the agent’s income is 
untaxed. 
  Then, the private agent (Agent 2) maximizes utility, deriving revenue from the 
production of the composite output yt=0.  The private agent accepts as given the 
monopolistically determined price Pgt=0 and quantity gt=0 of the public production good, as set 
by Agent 1; recall that a bar over a variable means that this variable is fixed and given to the 
agent.  Given this amount of the public production good, Agent 2 devotes all of the remaining 
capital k2t=0 to the production of the composite output good yt=0. 
  The allocation of capital between the two sectors is demonstrated in Figure 1. Here, Dki 
represents the demand for capital in sector i, MRk1 is the corresponding marginal revenue of   10 
public sector capital, and ri denotes the return to capital in sector i.  If the public agent 
behaved competitively, capital would be allocated between the sectors so as to equalize the 
returns to capital in each sector at rpc .  However, with monopolistic power, the public agent 
restricts the allocation of capital to the public sector, thereby generating a monopoly rent of (r1 
– r2) k1.
9 
  Recall that Agent 1 goes first by choosing k1t and c1t.  More formally, Agent 1 
maximizes the present value Hamiltonian, defined as 
  ( ) ( ) 11121211 1 tttttttttt LUsskkcs pxmyw ØøØø =+￿+-￿++￿-￿+- ºßºß     (16) 
This optimization defines the resulting growth path as 
( )
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where the first term in the brackets is the marginal utility of k1t and the second is the marginal 
product of k1t. 
  The private agent accepts the public agent’s choice of k1t and consequently accepts the 
levels of gt and yt.  Agent 2 then optimizes the present value Hamiltonian with respect to c2t 
and k2t, or 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22121222 11 ttttttttttt LUsskkycs jxlytw ØøØø =+￿+-￿++￿-￿--￿+- ºßºß .  (18) 
This optimization defines the growth path as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
8 In order that Agent 2 accept the level of corruption as given, it is easier to assume a sequential game.  Also, if 
the agents move sequentially, it is the case that dk2/dk1=dk1/dk2=0. 
9 Note that Agent 1’s saving s1t is not directly associated with k1t , and Agent 2’s saving s2t is also not directly 
associated with k1t.  This occurs because of the relationships 
  1212 tttttt ksskkk x =+-￿=+ &&&  
  11 tt sk „ &  
  22 tt sk „ &  , 
which mean that agents’ consumption decisions are independent of their capital allocation decisions.   11 
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&&
  (19) 
The balanced growth equilibrium is then defined as 
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Equations (17) and (19) may be solved using the capital accumulation equation to get 
the following analytic results:
10 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
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The basic solution is illustrated by Figure 2, which depicts a simple Solow-Swan type of 
growth model with the ratio (instead of the level) of capital stocks on the horizontal axis and 
net investment on the vertical axis.  Start from an initial allocation of capital between the 
sectors, given by (k1/k2)0 . As a country that is subject to corruption moves toward its steady 
                                                                 
10  Remember that a bar over a variable signifies that the level is given for the agent in question.  This is a direct 
result of the sequential nature of model.  For example, y denotes the level of corruption that is predetermined as 
far as the private agent is concerned.   12 
state equilibrium distribution of capital, the amount of publicly provided goods increases, 
implying a lower rate of return on capital, a lower monopoly rent for the public agent, and 
lower corruption; that is, more public services are provided at lower cost.  As a result, the 
welfare of both agents increases at the expense of lower growth.  The full model and a 
discussion of its solution are in the Appendix. 
However, the basic solution is characterized by extreme non-linearity in the solution 
for the economy-wide growth rate.  Consequently, there exist multiple equilibria for any given 












adgs = ,               (23) 
where a hat “^” denotes an analytic solution and where there is a strict association among 









> .  Although there likely does exist this same type of 














 and the model’s coefficients, this 






















 does not.  Put differently, the 
multiple equilibria are such that the optimal choices of c1 and c2 are related to the analytic 









  As a result, numerical solutions are needed to explore the model’s implications for 
optimal taxation.  These simulations are discussed next. 
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III.  Simulation Results 
Some initial insights into the choice of an optimal tax structure can be obtained by 
observing the effects on welfare of changes in one tax rate, holding the other tax rate constant.  
Tables 1, 2, and 3 report some of the results of these simulations, and Figures 3, 4, and 5 give 
a more complete presentation of the welfare effects of different tax mixes.
11 
  In Table 1 income taxes vary from 10 to 50 percent, while consumption taxes are set to 
zero.  Note that lower income tax rates generate less corruption (and also greater relative 
amounts of public capital).  However, each agent has a very different preference for income 
taxes.  At a 0 percent consumption tax rate, the public agent prefers a relatively high income 
tax (about 40 percent) because Agent 1 does not pay income taxes but nevertheless benefits 
from the public consumption good provided from tax revenues.  In contrast, the private agent 
prefers a relatively low income tax (about 10 percent).  With a zero consumption tax rate, 
global welfare is maximized at an income tax rate of over 20 percent, a level that can be 
viewed as balancing the wish of the public agent for a high income tax rate with that of the 
private agent for a low income tax rate.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of steady states as consumption tax rates vary, with 
constant 10 percent and 20 percent income tax rates, respectively.  Consumption taxes have 
significant welfare implications.  Unlike with income taxes, each agent’s preferences over 
consumption taxes are identical; that is, utility for each agent is maximized at the same 
                                                                 
11 All simulations are done with the following coefficient values: 
A =0 .1 
v = 1 
a = 0.25 
r = 0.02 
  g = 0.11 
  s = 0.25 
d = 0.75. 
 
Recall that s is the coefficient on the public consumption good in the agents’ utility functions and d is the 
congestion coefficient on the public consumption good.  A value of 0.25 for s signifies a public good that has 
moderate value to the agents, and a value of 0.75 for * signifies some degree of congestion in the good.   14 
consumption tax rate.  In Table 2, maximum utility occurs at a consumption tax of 5 percent 
(with an income tax of 10 percent), so that at a low income tax rate individual and global 
utilities increase with higher consumption taxes.  In contrast, a lower consumption tax of 
about 10 percent maximizes utility when the income tax is 0 percent (Table 3).  Since both 
agents are equally subject to consumption taxes and both agents equally benefit from 
consumption tax revenue, then both agents exhibit the same preferences over consumption 
taxes.
12 
The general nature of these results is also depicted in Figures 3, 4, and 5, which 
demonstrate that agents have very different preferences over the tax mix.
13  The public agent 
generally prefers a mix of a high income tax and a low consumption tax, while a private agent 
has the opposite preference. As demonstrated in Figure 5, the optimum tax mix for society 
balances these conflicting wishes of the agents. 
In Tables 1, 2, and 3 (and in Figures 3, 4, and 5), the size of government varies with 
the amount of taxes collected.  Table 4 and Figure 6 present the results where the relative size 




, remains constant, but where differing tax mixes are considered 
at the steady state.  As income taxes fall, consumption taxes are increased to compensate for 
the loss in public revenue.  The changing tax mix leads to a decline in relative corruption, 
which generates in turn a decrease in the public agent’s utility and an increase in that of the 
private agent.  Conversely, as government relies more heavily on income taxes, the public 
agent’s utility rises while the private agent’s utility falls.  Social welfare, defined simply as the 
unweighted sum of the individual utilities (U1+U2), balances these conflicting changes in 
utility.  In this case, the optimal tax mix occurs with a consumption tax rate of 21 percent and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
12  Other parameter values yield different quantitative results, but the basic qualitative results are unchanged.  For 
example, if s = 0.50 and d =0 .50, the optimal consumption tax (with a 10 percent income tax) is 25 percent, and 
the optimal consumption tax with a 20 percent income tax) is 10 percent. 
13 Note that Tables 1, 2, and 3 are imbedded in Figures 3, 4, and 5.   15 
an income tax rate of 50 percent.  Changing the level at which government is held fixed (e.g., 
10 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent) affects the exact levels of the optimal tax 
rates, but does not affect the general result that an optimal tax mix exists, one that balances the 
wish of the public agent for a greater reliance on the income tax with that of the private agent 
for more use of the consumption tax.  Changing the social welfare function to weight more 
heavily the welfare of the private agent shifts the optimal tax structure toward a greater 
reliance upon consumption taxation, while a greater welfare weight for the public agent leads 
to heavier income taxation at the social optimum. 
Importantly, how does the optimal tax mix for a corrupt economy compare to that for 
an economy without corruption?  Recall that, in the absence of corruption, public goods are 
provided competitively at least cost.  Recall also that the private agent’s welfare rises as the 
tax mix shifts toward income taxes and away from consumption taxes, since both agents pay 
consumption taxes but only the private agent pays income taxes.  Consequently, the tax mix in 
a “clean” economy relies more heavily on income taxes than on consumption taxes; put 
differently, in a “corrupt” economy the optimal tax mix makes greater use of consumption 
taxes than of income taxes.  Figure 7 depicts this result. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Our main result suggests that, holding the relative size of government constant, the 
presence of corruption generates an optimal tax mix that relies more heavily on consumption 
taxes than on income taxes.  This result is consistent with standard tax advice given to 
developing countries, especially those in which corruption is endemic: developing countries 
should rely more heavily upon indirect taxation than upon direct taxation (Newbery and Stern, 
1995).   16 
 This result is derived in a model in which the (relative) size of government is held 
constant.  Our model also allows us to investigate how social welfare varies with tax structure 
when the size of government of government is allowed to vary; that is, we are able to calculate 
the optimal size of government, and to compare the optimal size of government in a corrupt 
versus a clean economy.  To present this more fully, the relative government size (irrespective 
of the specific tax mix that generates it) is plotted in Figures 8, 9, and 10 against the utility of 
the public agent, the utility of the private agent, and social welfare (the sum of the utilities of 
the two agents), respectively.  The optimal government size necessarily occurs at the global 
welfare-maximizing tax mix.  In the presence of a corrupt public sector, there is still an 
important role for government; that is, neither agent achieves maximum utility in an economy 
with no government, even when that government is corrupt.  The optimal government size 
from the public agent’s point of view is roughly 30 percent (Figure 8), while the optimal 
government size from the private agent’s point of view is only 13 percent (Figure 9).   The 
government size that maximizes social welfare balances these conflicting objectives at 20 
percent (Figure 10). 
However, it is not surprising that the optimal size of government is greater in a clean 
economy than in a corrupt economy (Figure 11).
14  When there is no corruption, the optimal 
size of government is significantly greater, at 80 percent, because the negative effects of 
corruption on social welfare via the implied loss in production of the public consumption and 
production goods are no longer present. 
 In short, fiscal policy is decidedly affected by corruption, and affected in ways that are 
largely consistent with expectations.  Specifically, a corrupt economy should have a tax mix 
that relies more heavily upon consumption taxes than income taxes, and also one that has a 
                                                                 
14  Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 are generated using the same parameter values as everywhere else in the paper, that is, 
the public good parameter in each agent’s utility function, or s, is assumed to equal 0.25, and the congestion 
parameter on the public good d equals 0.75. Other (unreported) simulations demonstrate that an increase in the   17 
smaller government, than an economy without corruption.  The task then becomes finding 
ways in which corruption can be reduced.
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
preference parameter s leads to a larger optimal size of government, while an increase in the congestion 
parameter d generates a smaller optimal government.   18 
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Figure 1 
The Allocation of Capital Between the Public and Private Sectors 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 5 















































































Tax Substitution Effects On Welfare At The Steady State: No Corruption 
 
Figure 8 
Relative Size of Government Versus Welfare At The Steady State: Public Agent 
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Figure 9 
Relative Size of Government Versus Welfare At The Steady State: Private Agent 
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Figure 11 
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1 2 3 4 5
U2 + U1  = 9.337 9.545 9.662 9.689 9.584
U1= 4.281 4.3313 4.331 4.279 4.151
U2= 5.056 5.214 5.331 5.411 5.433
k1/k2= 0.185 0.208 0.226 0.240 0.252
y /y= 0.180 0.156 0.131 0.106 0.080
t = 0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100
w = 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tax Revenue/y= 0.410 0.337 0.261 0.179 0.092
Table 1
Steady State at Various Income Tax Rates
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
U2 + U1  = 9.557 9.575 9.590 9.599 9.5992 9.584
U1= 4.139 4.147 4.153 4.157 4.1572 4.151
U2= 5.418 5.428 5.437 5.442 5.4420 5.433
k1/k2= 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.252
y /y= 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080
t = 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
w = 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000
Tax Revenue/y= 0.203 0.184 0.164 0.142 0.118 0.092
Table 2
Steady State: t=10% and Various Consumption Tax Rates
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
U2 + U1  = 9.564 9.592 9.619 9.645 9.669 9.689
U1= 4.223 4.236 4.247 4.259 4.269 4.279
U2= 5.341 5.356 5.371 5.386 5.399 5.411
k1/k2= 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240
y /y= 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106
t = 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
w = 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000
Tax Revenue/y= 0.272 0.257 0.240 0.221 0.201 0.179
Table 3




1 2 3 4 5 6 7
U2 + U1  = 9.161 9.164 9.165 9.165 9.164 9.162 9.159
U1= 4.220 4.213 4.206 4.202 4.198 4.188 4.178
U2= 4.941 4.951 4.959 4.963 4.966 4.974 4.980
k1/k2= 0.171 0.177 0.183 0.185 0.188 0.193 0.198
y /y= 0.192 0.188 0.183 0.180 0.178 0.173 0.169
t = 0.550 0.530 0.510 0.500 0.490 0.470 0.450
w = 0.031 0.104 0.177 0.213 0.250 0.324 0.398
Tax Revenue/y= 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450
Table 4
Steady State: Tax Substitution with Constant Government Size
 
 